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Symptomatic of prevailing attitudes toward military justice is the
recent remark of a law school professor upon hearing a proposal to
offer a course in the subject at his school: "Humph I We might as
well teach canon law." No pun was intended. He felt, as probably
most lawyers do, that military justice was a small, highly specialized
branch of law, worthy of attention only in time of war, and even then
applying to comparatively few people and affecting their lives in a
relatively insignificant way. He failed, as many others do, to appre-
ciate the part played by military justice in the total administration of
criminal law in the United States.
It is well known that military justice differs materially from civilian
criminal justice both in matters of substantive law and in matters of
procedure. What is not so well known is how much of the total crime
problem of the nation is handled within the armed forces. It is the
purpose of this article to explore that question. Two comparisons are
made. One deals with what might be called "Crime potential": how
many criminal offenses' can be expected from the armed forces and from
civilians, respectively, percentagewise? The other deals with actual
judicial business- how many criminal cases are tried by courts-martial
as compared with the number tried by civilian courts? The answers
to these questions will prove only that an unexpectedly large part of
the criminal business of the nation is entrusted to military authorities.
However, that fact, plus the already existing realization that military
justice is vastly different from civilian criminal justice, should reveal
1. This article does not deal with what some sociologists call "deviant behavior"
generally, but with crime in the technical, legal sense of conduct which is punishable
through legal proceedings by traditional criminal sanctions.
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At the height of mobilization in World War II, there were
12,300,000 persons in the armed forces of the United States 2 as
compared with a total population of 130,000,000 for the nation.3
These figures would seem to indicate that almost 10 percent of the
nation's crime potential was among persons subject to military law-a
not insignificant figure.
The figure swells, however, as the make-up of the armed forces
is analyzed in the light of the normal incidence of crime according
to sex and age. The services were not a representative cross-section
of the population, but were composed predominantly of the sex and
age groups in which the incidence of crime is highest. Men, who
account, approximately, for 90 percent of all crime,4 constituted the
overwhelming bulk of the armed forces. There were over 12,000,000
men, as contrasted with about 275,000 women.- Furthermore, about
75 percent of the men were under 30 years of age, and of the re-
mainder, 20 percent were between the ages of 30 and 40.6 According
to general crime statistics, persons between 17 and 30 account for at
least 45 percent of the total crime of the nation and those between 30
2. THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1949, p. 325. This article deals only with military justice as
applied to persons serving as uniformed members of the armed forces of the United
States. It should be realized, however, that military jurisdiction extends over a great
many other people at certain times and under certain conditions: civilians serving with the
armed forces in the field, citizens of occupied hostile countries; prisoners of war; and even
ordinary civilian citizens of the United States when living under martial law. The addi-
tional problems posed by the extension of military jurisdiction over such persons, though
not considered in this article, indicate that even greater significance should be attributed
to the role of the armed forces in the total administration of criminal justice.
3. THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1949, p. 163. The population figures used for comparisons
dealing with peak mobilization are those of the 1940 census, that being the one closest to
the period being compared. All figures are approximate and deal with population within
the continental limits of the United States.
4. All figures used in this article with respect to crime potential for certain age and
sex groups are based on averages for the years 1:941, 1948, 1949, and 1950 taken from the
Uniform Crime Reports, United States Government Printing Office:
Vol. XII Pp. 202-207 (1941')
Vol. XIX Pp. 113-117 (1948)
Vol. XX Pp. 111-115 (1949)
Vol. XXI Pp. 107-110 (1950)
These statistics are based upon FBI records of persons fingerprinted after being arrested
for violations of state laws and municipal ordinances. The figures obviously do not cover
unreported crime or even all reported crime, but they seem to provide a fair sampling, at
least for purposes of such a comparison as we are trying to make.
5. SELECTIVE SERVICE AND VICTORY, United States Government Printing Office 1948, p. 617.
6. All figures used in this article dealing with the age breakdown of men in service are
approximations based on Selective Service tables showing the ages of men at the dates of
their entrance into the Army and Navy. See AcE IN THE SELECnVE SERVICE PROCESS, Special
Monograph 9, United States Government Printing Office, 1946, pp. 274, 284.
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and 40 account for about 25 percent.7 Discounting these figures by one-
tenth for the amount of crime attributable to women of those age
groups, we arrive at the conclusion that men between 17 and 30 are
responsible for slightly more than 40 percent and those between 30
and 40 are responsible for about 23 percent of the total crime of the
nation.
When we combine with these statistics, others showing what per-
centage of the nation's males in the significant age groups were in the
armed forces, we approach some degree of accuracy in estimating the
crime potential handled by the military authorities as compared with
that left to civilian authorities. According to the 1940 census, there
were slightly fewer than 15 million males in the nation between 17 and
30.1 Nine million of'these, or 60 percent, were in the armed forces.9
Since this age and sex group accounts for 40 percent of the total
crime, it would seem that the armed forces, acquiring 60 percent of the
group, would thereby acquire 24 percent of the total crime potential
of the nation (60 percent x 40 percent = 24 percent).
Similarly, there were slightly under 10,000,000 males in the nation
between the ages of 30 and 40.10 Of these, 2,400,000 or 24 percent,
were in the armed forces.-" Since the group as a whole accounts for
23 percent of the nation's crime, it follows that the armed forces,
acquiring 24 percent of the men, would thereby also acquire 6 percent
of the total crime potential of the nation (24 percent x 23 percent = 6
percent).
Adding these two figures together, we reach the conclusion that, at
the time of peak mobilization in World War II, 30 percent of the
total crime of the nation could be expected to be in the armed forces.
This disregards the potential crime that might be anticipated from
the small group of men over 40 (5 percent of the total) and the
women serving in the armed forces. In other words, subject to factors
to be discussed later, it would appear that 70 percent of the total
crime potential in the nation was left to civilian authorities while 30
percent was placed in the hands of military authorities-a ratio of
about 2 to 1.
The foregoing figures deal with the crime potential of the civilian
7. See note 4, supra.
8. THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1949, p. 199.
9. This figure is based upon the percentages of different age groups in the armed forces
(see note 6 supra) as applied to strength at peak mobilization. (75 percent x 12,000,000
9,000,000).
10. THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1949, p. 199.
11. This figure is based upon the percentages of different age groups in the armed




population of the entire nation as compared with that of the total
military population. It must be remembered, however, that in dealing
with military justice, we are dealing with what is now a single system,
whereas civilian criminal justice is divided among 48 separate state
systems and a federal system. Until recently, the Army and Navy
operated separate, though similar, systems; but since May 31, 1951,
there is a Uniform Code of Military Justice, 12 applying to all of the
armed services. For this reason, a comparison of the military system
with individual civilian systems appears justified. The results are even
more striking.
New York, our most populous state, provides an interesting focus.
The t6 tal population of the state was about 13,500,000 people,13 but
half of these were women; and of the men, most of them were too
young or too old to account for a large volume of crime. If we use
the same type of analysis that has been applied to the comparison of
the population of the armed forces with the total civilian population
of the nation, it appears that the armed forces at the peak of World
War II mobilization had three times the crime potential of the state of
New York in time of peace. New York in 1940 had about 1,400,000
men over 17 years and under 30 years of age.' 4 This group, based on
national statistics, could be expected to account for 40 percent of the
state's total crime. The armed forces had, during World War II
peak mobilization, about 9,000,000 men in the same age group, or
more than six times as many. Those men would be expected, there-
fore, to account for a volume of crime per year more than six times as
large as the volume of crime expected from all men of the same age
group in the state of New York in a year of peace. This amounts to
259 percent of the total crime expected from all people in the state,
according to the foregoing figures. Similarly, New York had that year
about 1,100,000 men in the age group 30 through 39.15 Based on
national averages, this group could be expected to account for 23
percent of the state's total crime. The armed forces at World War II
peak mobilization, had 2,400,000 men in the same age group or more
than twice as many. These men, therefore, would be expected to
account for a volume of crime per year about twice as large as the
volume of crime expected from all men of the same age group in the
12. Public Law 506-81st Cong., Ch. 169-2d Session.
13. THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1949, p. 164.




state of New York. This amounts to 50 percent of the total crime
expected from all people in the state, according to the foregoing
figures. Adding the two figures together, we see that the armed
forces at peak mobilization had about 300 percent of the total crime
potential of the state of New York in time of peace-a ratio of 3 to 1.
In time of war, of course, many of New York's men would be in the
armed forces, thus materially diminishing the crime problem faced by
the civilian authorities of the state. The significant decrease of civilian
crime in time of war 16 would be difficult to explain were it not for the
role played by military justice.
The only civilian system which has criminal jurisdiction over more
people than New York's is that of the Federal government. Its
jurisdiction, however, is limited as to subject matter. Since the Federal
government has no power to define crime generally except in such
places as are subject to its exclusive jurisdiction, (certain territories,
military reservations and the like),17 primary power to define and
punish crime remains vested in the states. Congress can legislate for
the entire nation only with respect to matters enumerated in the Federal
constitution,1 8 and consequently the Federal criminal system handles
only crimes which are connected with the currency, the mails, national
defense, interstate commerce and so forth. There are comparatively
few such crimes.' 9 The military system, as will be shown more fully
later, handles all crimes committed by military personnel, including
all that are common to civilian criminal law as well as a great many
others.
Unless the statistics just given are to be disturbed, the largest single
system of criminal justice in the nation in time of war would appear
to be that administered by the military authorities.
Are the figures to be discounted? Can they be discounted on the
ground that men in the armed services are selected in such a way as
to eliminate those with criminal tendencies? Or on the ground that the
jurisdiction of military courts is limited or ineffectual? Or on the
ground that conditions of life in the services are such as to diminish
crime? These questions will be discussed in the order indicated.
16. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, Vol. XIX, No. 2 p. -118; THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1949,
p. 462; LUNDEN, STATISTICS ON CRIME AND CRIMINALS, Stevenson and Foster Co., Pennsyl-
vania 1942, pp. 141-146.
17. U.S. Constit. Art. IV, Sec. 3; Art. I, Sec. 8.
18. U.S. Constit. Art. I, Sec. 8.
19. Federal criminal law is growing vigorously, in the sense that many crimes formerly
considered solely the responsibility of the states are coming under the cognizance of
Federal authorities because of their interstate aspects. Nevertheless, the fact remains that
Congress does not have general power to legislate with respect to crime.
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Screening of Potential Criminals
First, are men in the services a select group from whom less crime
can be expected than from their brothers in civilian life?
Selective Service regulations provide part of the answer to this
question. At the beginning of World War II, some attempt was made
to screen out men with criminal tendencies. "IV F" was the classifi-
cation given to men whom the armed forces did not want because they
were physically, mentally or morally unfit. Moral unfitness was determ-
ined in part by a man's record. If he had been convicted of a "heinous
crime," which was defined to include treason, murder, rape, kidnaping,
arson, sodomy, pandering, and crimes involving sex perversion or deal-
ing in narcotics, he became "IV F." The same was true if he had been
twice convicted of other crimes which were punishable by one year or
more in prison; and the same was true if he was a "chronic offender."
20
In other words, a mere record was not enough to keep a man out of
service: it had to be a bad one. Indeed, if a man were in jail for the
first time and for a crime that was not "heinous," he became eligible
for induction into the armed forces immediately upon his release.
This type of screening did not last long. By the end of 1942, when
the manpower shortage was being felt, the standards had been lowered
to take almost anyone. Men accused of crime, even though very serious,
frequently were given the option of going to jail or enlisting. So com-
mon was this practice that it became virtually codified in the Selective
Service regulations in a special procedure. 2 1 Rules as to hardened
criminals, that is, "repeaters," or men who had committed "heinous"
crimes, or who previously had been discharged dishonorably from the
services, were similarly relaxed. Such men also could get into service,
sometimes even directly from jail.22 A fair conclusion, then, seems to
be that few men were kept out of the armed services by Selective
Service regulations because of criminal tendencies.
The armed services themselves had further devices for screening
out potential criminals, but their effectiveness is open to doubt. A
psychiatric examination was given at the time of induction, necessarily
quite hurried, and probably directed primarily toward finding sex devia-
20. SELECTIVE SERVICE REGULATIONS, United States Government Printing Office, 1944,
Sept. 23, 1940 to Feb. 1, 1942. Vol. III, Sec. XXIV, Par. 362, p. 34.
21. SELECTIVE SERVICE REGULATIONS, United States Government Printing Office, 1944,
Feb. 1, 1942 to Feb. 1, 1943, 622.61, p. 277; ENFORCEMENT OF THE SELECTIVE SERVICE LAW,
SPECIAL MONOGRAPH 14, United States Government Printing Office, 1951, p. 67-9.
22. ENFORCEMENT OF THE SELECTIVE SERVICE LAW, Special Monograph 14, United States
Government Printing Office, 1951, pp. 67-74; LOCAL BOARD MEMORANDA (United States




tions rather than criminal tendencies. There also were administrative
methods of discharging undesirables after they were in service. Only
52,000 such discharges seem to have been given during the entire war,23
most of them presumably for physical or mental incapacity, rather than
for criminal habits or tendencies. In any event, 52,000 is quite an
insignificant figure when dealing with the total number of persons in
uniform during World War II.
The conclusion that most criminals were not in fact screened out by
Selective Service authorities or by the armed forces themselves is sup-
ported by the estimate that there were between 100,000 and 200,000
ex-convicts serving in the armed forces during World War 11.24 These
figures do not include those inducted on the "jail or fight" basis already
mentioned.
Jurisdiction
The next question to be considered concerns the extent of criminal
jurisdiction possessed by military authorities. Do they have power to
punish servicemen for as wide a variety of offenses as civilian authori-
ties have with respect to civilians?
During World War II, men in the Army and Air Force were sub-
ject to the Articles of War, and men in the Navy, to the Articles for
Government of the Navy. Both codes made punishable in military
tribunals a great many civilian-type crimes-murder, rape, larceny,
and the like.25 Not all crimes known to civilian life were specifically
enumerated, but those not mentioned were nevertheless chargeable
under the so-called "general" articles.26  These notorious dragnets
covered not only vaguely defined military misconduct, but also all acts
which could possibly result in criminal prosecution in civilian life, not
on the theory that such acts fitted the definition of some civilian criminal
statute but rather on the theory that they constituted "conduct unbecom-
23. H. R. Misc. Rep. No. 1510, 79th Cong., 2d Session, Jan. 30, 1946.
24. SHATrUCK, Military Sersice for Men 'with Criminal Records IX FEDERAL PROBATION
No. 1, p. 14, 1945.
25. Articles of War 92 and 93; Articles for the Government of the Navy (hereafter
"A.W." and "A.G.N.", respectively), Art. 6, 8.
26. The Army Articles of War read as follows: A. W. 95: "Any officer or cadet who
is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be dismissed from
the service." A. W. 96: "Though not mentioned in these articles, all disorders and neglects
to the prejudice of good order and military discipline, all conduct of a nature to bring
discredit upon the miltary service, and all crimes or offenses not capital, of which persons
subject to military law may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general or special
or summary court-martial, according to the nature and degree of the offense, and punished
at the discretion of such court." Navy Article 22a: "Offenses not specified.-All offenses
committed by persons belonging to the Navy which are not specified in the foregoing articles
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct."
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ing an officer and gentleman" or "conduct of a nature to bring discredit
upon the military service" or "disorders and neglects to the prejudice
of good order and military discipline" or other crimes or offenses of
which persons in the armed services might be guilty. The same is true
today under the new Uniform Code of Military Justice: some crimes
are enumerated specifically; all others can be charged under general
articles.2 7 Even the limitation which prevailed under the old Army
code to the effect that murder and rape could not be tried by military
tribunals if committed in time of peace within the continental limits
of the United States has been removed. 28
Furthermore, military jurisdiction is not limited to civilian type
crimes. It also extends to a wide variety of other offenses unknown to
civilian life. These are the so-called "military offenses," to be dis-
cussed later.
Nor are there any geographical limits on military jurisdiction. The
fact that a serviceman commits a crime away from the military reserva-
tion at which he is serving or even outside the United States does not
deprive military authorities of power to punish him for it. Civilian
criminal jurisdiction is much more narrowly circumscribed. For ex-
ample, the New York authorities can only punish persons for crimes
that they commit in New York. If a New Yorker murders someone in
California, he can be tried only in that state. Similarly, the Federal
authorities, generally speaking, can try a man only for a crime com-
mitted in the United States.29 But military authorities can punish a
serviceman for a crime committed anywhere in the world. Their power
is dependent not upon the place where a crime is committed, but on the
military status of the person committing it.30
If a crime is committed by a serviceman inside of the United States,
he normally is subject to punishment by civilian as well as military
authorities. This, however, does not appreciably cut down the volume
of criminal business handled by the military authorities, because the
27. Uniform Code of Military Justice (hereafter "U.C.M.J."), Art. 133: "Any officer,
cadet, or midshipman who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentle-
man shall be punished as a court-martial may direct." U.C.M.J., art. 134: "Though not
specifically mentioned in this code, all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order
and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the
armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons subject to this code
may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general or special or summary court-
martial, accordance to the nature and degree of the offense, and punished at the discretion
of such court."
28. U.C.M.J., arts. 118, 120. The restriction under the old code does not affect the com-
parisons made in this article, as the period compared is during time of war, when military
courts had jurisdiction over these offenses regardless of where committed.
29. Cf. United States v. Bowman (1922), 260 U.S. 94.
30. U.C.M.J., arts. 2, 3, 5; Preamble to old Articles of War.
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civilian authorities, although possessing power to try servicemen, are
reluctant to use it. They generally prefer to return military culprits
to military control. Usually local working arrangements are developed
between military and civilian authorities along this line. During World.)
War II, the standard practice, so far as the Army was concerned at
least, was for military courts to handle all cases involving servicemen,
murder and rape included."
As to crimes committed by servicemen outside of the United States,
the military authorities have exclusive jurisdiction. By the rules of
international law, American servicemen in hostile territory are not
subject to trial by the local civilian courts, but only to trial by American
military courts. 2 The same is true when American forces are in friendly
territory. 33 In fact, during World War II, England codified this rule
of international law into a statute.3 4
Thus, whether considered from the point of view of subject matter
or geography, military jurisdiction is adequate to deal with all crimes
committed by men in the armed forces.
Conditions of Military Life
The final question to be considered in appraising the tentative con-
clusions reached earlier in this article is whether conditions of life in
the armed forces are such as to diminish crime among servicemen. A
clear answer is impossible because so little is known about the causes of
crime. There are, however, a few facts that can be noted.
Economic motivation for crime probably is diminished for many
men in the service. There at least they have jobs. Some doubtless
think they have to have more money, but on the whole, they don't
fare so badly that they are likely to consider crime necessary to life.
Also, some men are removed from gangs or other vicious associations
in civilian life. Perhaps they can find equally vicious associates in the
services, but at least it takes time. Some men are removed from
familiar opportunities and instrumentalities for the commission of
crime. For example, a man in civilian life might have an established
criminal business in the numbers racket or bootlegging. Upon induc-
31. It should be noted, incidentally, that even though a serviceman is tried by a state
court, he is still subject to trial by court-martial for the same offense, and cannot avail
himself of the defense of double jeopardy. If, however, he is tried by a Federal court, the
defense of double jeopardy does apply. Cf. Grafton v. United States (1907), 206 U.S. 333.
32. Dow v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 158 (1879).
33. Ibid.
34. 5 & 6 Geo. 6 c 31, (Visiting Forces Act, 1942) (Vol. 36, Chitty's English Statutes,
6th Ed. 1942, p. 17).
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tion, he would be removed from his old facilities. He probably could
find new opportunities in the service, but again it would take time.
These factors tend to diminish crime in the armed services.
On the other hand, men are removed from the restraining influences
of civilian life: their families, their jobs, their friends, and their home
communities. Uprooted, and clothed with the anonymity of uniforms,
many of them are subjected to temptations never known before, and
many of them are given hitherto unknown opportunities for criminal
conduct. Such factors tend to increase crime in the armed forces.
How should these competing factors be weighed? We do not know.
A still greater uncertainty is involved in attempting to compare the
type of criminal conduct committed by servicemen with that com-
mitted by civilians. As shown earlier, servicemen can be punished by
military authorities for all crimes known to civilian life; but do service-
men in fact commit all of the types of crime for which civilians can be
punished? On the other hand, do they engage in any types of conduct
for which they can be criminally punished, but for which civilians
cannot?
It is evident that there are many regulations in civilian life, backed
by criminal sanctions, which have little or no application to men in the
armed forces. Off-hand examples are the pure food and drug laws, and
regulations as to the conduct of business enterprises. To the extent
that servicemen cannot or do not commit such crimes, our earlier statisti-
cal conclusions as to the percentage of the nation's total crime potential
in the armed forces will have to be revised downward.
On the other hand, those conclusions will have to be revised upward
to take account of conduct made criminal in the armed forces but not
in civilian life. This brings us to a consideration of military offenses,
familiar examples of which are absence without leave, desertion, and
disobedience of superior officers. 35
Military Offenses
In civilian life, a man can quit his job, go on strike, or tell his boss
to go to the devil without running afoul of the criminal law. In fact,
he is protected by law in the exercise of such rights. Once he becomes
a soldier or sailor, however, he can be tried by court-martial if he
does any of these things. Quitting one's job is called "desertion."
Going on strike is called "mutiny." Defying one's boss is called "wil-
35. U.C.M.J., arts. 85, 86, 90; A.W. 58, 61, 64-; A.G.N., arts. 4 (2) (6), 8 (19) (21).
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ful disobedience of the lawful order of a superior officer." All are
subject to severe penalties, even death in time of war. 6
The most that can happen to a man for equivalent conduct in civilian
life is loss of his job. That economic sanction, for obvious reasons, is
not available in military life. Some other means must be found to deal
with men who fail or refuse to do their jobs. The historical answer has
been the creation of military offenses, substituting criminal sanctions in
military life for conduct which in civilian life would be handled by
economic sanctions.
Military offenses are no less serious than civilian crimes. They pose
problems which involve the very existence of the military establish-
ment and which are certainly no less difficult than those posed by
ordinary civilian-type crimes. They are handled in the same way and
punished in the same way. In fact, during World War II, military
offenses generally carried heavier penalties than civilian-type crimes.
For example, for armed robbery-unquestionably a serious civilian-
type crime-the maximum punishment in the Army was ten years in
jail; but for absence without leave-one of the lesser military offenses
- the maximum punishment was life imprisonment, 37 with sentences
actually imposed not infrequently running beyond the maximum possible
penalty for armed robbery.38
Military offenses (which are entirely beyond the jurisdiction of
civilian authorities) account for the greater part of the work involved
in the administration of military justice. Two-thirds of all persons im-
prisoned by sentence of court-martial were convicted solely of military
offenses. The remaining one-third were found guilty of either civilian-
type crimes alone or civilian and military offenses combined. 9
Whether the absence of certain types of civilian crimes in the armed
forces is compensated by the presence of military offenses, we do not
know-any more than we know whether conditions of military life
tend to increase or decrease crime. In the absence of further knowledge
about the causes and incidence of crime, any a priori judgment which
would invalidate the statistical conclusions already reached seems un-
justified.
36. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, (hereafter "MCM"), United States Army 1928,
Par. 104; MCM, 1951, Par. 127.
37. MCM, U.S. Army 1928, par. 104-.
38. The fact that the armed forces had elaborate clemency procedures does not invalidate
this observation. Clemency was exercised not only with respect to military offenses, but
also with respect to civilian-type offenses. Furthermore, clemency is not unique to the armed
forces. It exists in civilian systems of criminal justice.
39. MACCORMICK AND EvJaN, Statistical Study of 24,000 Military Prisoners X FEDERAL




Another method of measuring the relative scope of military justice
is to compare the number of criminal cases handled by courts-martial
with the number handled by civilian courts. Since there are no reliable
statistics covering civilian courts for the entire nation,40 our starting
points are the New York and the Federal courts.
In 1945, there were approximately 730,000 trials by courts-martial.41
During the same period, there were about 37,500 criminal cases tried
in all of the Federal courts4 2-a ratio of about 1 to 20. At about the
same time and for an equal period-July 1, 1944 to January 30, 1945
-the courts of the state of New York handled about 207,000 cases4 3
-a ratio of about 1 to 3. Even adding together all of the criminal
cases tried by both the Federal and New York courts (244,500), we
find that courts-martial handled almost three times that many. The
New York figures do not include cases involving violations of local
ordinances generally, but do include motor vehicle violations except
for parking.4 The military figures do not include cases disposed of by
"company punishment"-a form of administrative disciplinary action
used extensively for minor offenses.45 Hence, the comparison, though
far from exact, seems a fair one, since very minor offenses are excluded
in both computations.
The ratio of cases tried as between military courts and the courts
of New York corresponds closely to the 3 to 1 ratio of crime potential
as between the same two systems already discussed. Perhaps this cor-
respondence is merely fortuitous. There are many uncertainties in-
volved. Some we have already discussed: the effectiveness of attempt-
ing to screen out potential criminals from the armed forces; the dual
jurisdiction of military and civilian courts over civilian-type offenses
committed by servicemen; the presence of military offenses as against
the absence of certain civilian-type offenses among servicemen; the
conditions of military life as compared with those of civilian life; the
40. The statistics found in JUDICIAL CRIMINAL STATISTICS, U.S. Dept. of Commerce,
Bureau of Census, Washington, D. C., are of limited value, since only about 25 states
report normally, and even among them, the methods of reporting are not uniform.
41. THE ARMY ALMANAC, United States Government Printing Office 1950, p. 742 lists
the army figure for 1945 as 480,219. The Navy figure of 258,383, obtained directly by
correspondence from the Navy Department, was added to the Army figure for the total
used here. It is assumed that the figures for the Army and Navy include the Marines and
the Air Corps.
42. Annual Report (1950), Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, p. 116. This was
a peak year for the Federal courts.
43. Twelfth Annual Report, N. Y. Jud. Council, 1946, pp. 154-157.
44. Ibid.
45. See U.C.M.J., art. 15; cf. old A. W. 104.
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equivalence or lack of it between civilian and military judicial statistics.
Still other uncertainties are present. Is there a better system for dis-
covering, reporting and trying crime in military life than in civilian life?
Does "discipline" in the armed forces prevent crime? Or does it incite
crime? Do all of the various factors which might be thought to increase
crime in the armed forces cancel out all of the various factors which
might be thought to decrease crime? Whatever one's answers to ques-
tions such as these may be, the fact remains that we have discovered in
comparing New York's system of criminal justice with that of the armed
forces, a close correspondence between the ratio of crime potential and
the ratio of criminal cases tried. Unless New York is an unfair sample,
therefore, we should expect the same correspondence to prevail in a
comparison of military with civilian criminal justice through the whole
nation. There is no reason to believe that New York is an unfair sample.
Assuming, then, that the ratio of cases tried will correspond to the
ratio of crime potential, we conclude that the armed forces at peak
mobilization in World War II not only handled one-third of the
nation's crime potential, but also that their courts handled one-third of
all criminal cases tried in the nation, with the remaining two-thirds
being divided between 49 civilian systems.
MILITARY JUSTICE IN TIME OF PEACE
Thus far our discussion has dealt with military justice in time of
war. What about the system in time of peace, or "cold" war? Is it
still a significant factor in the total administration of criminal justice
in the nation?
Present mobilization plans call for a fighting force of four million
persons, 46 all subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, admin-
istered by a single system of courts. Based upon past experience, 70
court-martial trials per year can be expected for each 1,000 men in the
armed forces. Applying this figure to a fighting force of four million,
we arrive at the conclusion that 280,000 court-martial trials are to
be anticipated per year. This compares with about 267,000 criminal
cases tried by the courts of New York during 1949, the last year for
which statistics are available.48 Thus, even without a large-scale war,
46. TIME MAGAZINE, Oct. 1, 1951, p. 18; U. S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Oct. 26, 1951,
p. 10; NEW YORK TrmEs, Oct. 21, 1951. Page 55, col. 3.
47. This is a conservative figurb. General Marshall, commenting on improved morale
in the Army in 1940, noted that court-martial rates per 1000 men fell from 90 to 78 that
year. THE WAR REPORTS OF MARSHALL, ARNOLD AND KING (Lippincott 1947) p. 55. In
direct correspondence with the Air Force, the authors of this article learned that the rate
per 1000 men per year in the Air Force was 74.3 in 1949 and 66.9 in 1950.
48. SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT, N. Y. Jud. Council, 1951, pp. 146-9. This figure
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it would appear that the military system of justice handles a greater
volume of criminal business than that handled by the nation's largest
civilian system.
A comparison based on crime potenital is less feasible, chiefly because
of a dearth of public information as to the present composition of the
armed forces according to sex and age groups. However, assuming
that the composition is about the same as during World War II peak
mobilization, we can at least make a guess as to the proportion of the
nation's crime potential handled by the armed forces at a time like
the present. Since present strength is about one-third of World War II
peak strength, it would appear that the armed forces are now faced
with about one-third of the crime potential that they were faced with
in 1945. They then handled one-third of the nation's total crime
potential, and consequently now they must be faced with about one-
ninth of the total (1/3 x 1/3 - 1/9).
If we are willing again to assume a correspondence between crime
potential and criminal cases, we can also make a guess as to what
proportion of all criminal cases in the nation are handled by courts-
martial at a time like the present. Since one-ninth of the nation's
crime potential is to be found in the armed forces, one-ninth of the
criminal cases can reasonably be expected to be tried by courts-martial.
Such is the comparison at present. Since the nation seems involved
in a continuing crisis, with most responsible leaders agreed that the
present state of mobilization must continue for some time to come,
the conclusion seems justified that military justice is the largest single
system of criminal justice in the nation, not only in time of war, but
also in time of peace; now, and as far ahead as we can see.
excludes local ordinance violations and motor vehicle violations except such as are stated
to be "misdemeanors."
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